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Abstract. This paper deals with a development of the ancient thought on mimesis in 
its modern reception as regards a certain idea of theatre. It defends the hypothesis 
that the figure of the character, as set up in Diderot’s Paradoxe sur le comédien, has 
its source in a curious reversal of the Platonic mimesis. After presenting the main ten-
ets of Plato’s reflection on mimesis and of Diderot’s theory on character, showing their 
convergences and contrasts, it is analyzed how such a conceptual turnaround has his-
torically taken place, by establishing a chain of reception from Plato to Diderot passing 
through Cicero and the Renaissance artists. 
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À Florence. Le portail d’une église. 
TEBALDEO FRECCIA, s’approchant de Valo-
ri — Ah! monseigneur, qu’il est doux de voir un 
homme tel que Votre Eminence parler ainsi de la 
tolérance et de l’enthousiasme sacré! […] Trou-
ver sur les lèvres d’un honnête homme ce qu’on 
a soi-même dans le cœur, c’est le plus grand des 
bonheurs qu’on puisse désirer.
VALORI — N’êtes-vous pas le petit Freccia?
TEBALDEO — Mes ouvrages ont peu de mérite; 
je sais mieux aimer les arts que je ne sais les 
exercer. Mais ma jeunesse toute entière s’est pas-
sée dans les églises. Il me semble que je ne puis 
admirer ailleurs Raphaël et notre divin Buo-
narotti. Je demeure alors durant des journées 
devant leurs ouvrages, dans une extase sans 
égale. Le chant de l’orgue me révèle leur pensée, 
et me fait pénétrer dans leur âme. […]
LORENZO  — Pourquoi remettre vos offres de 
service? Vous avez, il me semble, un cadre dans 
les mains.
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TEBALDEO  — Il est vrai; 
mais je n’ose le montrer à de 
si grands connaisseurs. C’est 
une esquisse bien pauvre 
d’un rêve magnifique.
LORENZO — Vous faites le 
portrait de vos rêves? Je ferai 
poser pour vous quelques-
uns des miens.
TEBALDEO  — Réaliser 
des rêves, voilà la vie du 
peintre.
Alfred de Musset, Loren-
zaccio, Act II, scene 2.
«Why has the notion of mimesis so deeply 
characterized the history of the theory of art in 
Western tradition?»1. And which mimesis? This 
paper is an attempt to answer the question posed 
by the organizers of the conference by reference to 
a certain “idea of theatre”.
Plato is the first who has profoundly explored 
the mimetic arts from a theoretical point of view. 
By including in this category both poetry and 
the visual arts, he makes of the notion of mime-
sis, although in a problematic manner, the back-
ground of all later thought on art. The controver-
sial status of mimesis in the Western history of 
aesthetics is at the same time indissociable from 
Plato’s ontology. Thus, the articulation of the cou-
pling mimesis-idea would mark the modern fate 
of the general artistic principle of representation. 
This is the hypothesis that I aim to test, through 
the surprising itinerary of a certain modern recep-
tion of Platonism. It concerns theatre, and more 
precisely one of its central figures: the character. 
Understood by Diderot, in his Paradoxe sur le 
comédien — «the founding text for the modern 
reworking of the mimesis question», according 
1 Ways of Imitation, International Conference, call for 
papers. This paper has benefited from the instructive 
remarks and reading of Prof. Andrea Capra (University of 
Milan) and Prof. José García Roca (University of Valen-
cia). My gratitude to them and to Raquel Cascales Tornel, 
Kathaleen Reidy and Yasmin Syed-Leroy for their help 
and friendship.
to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe ([1986]: 10, trans. 
mine) —, as the ideal model to which the actor 
tries to adjust himself — «modèle idéal auquel 
l’acteur cherche à se conformer» (Diderot [1995]: 
73) —, the character in modern theatre would 
have its source in a curious reversal of the Platonic 
mimesis, whose stages and conceptual issues I will 
try to specify in this paper.
Yet, such an hypothesis requires, in order to be 
authenticated, three verifications:
1) First, it must be proved that the mimetic 
scheme applies to what we understand as theatre, 
which in principle is not evident.
Mimesis, in Plato, does not designate the theat-
rical act as representation or performance. In clas-
sical Greek, the word théatron (“place for seeing”) 
can designate the building as “place of assembly” 
(Liddell-Scott [1996], s.v.) or, to a minor extent, 
the scenic dimension of representation2, but not, as 
we tend to think, a literary genre. The term mime-
sis is certainly related to dramatic poetry (tragedy 
and comedy), and it is also true that, in the context 
in which Plato wrote, the oral and performative 
dimension was inherent to poetry3. But, togeth-
er with the poet, the painter is equally defined as 
a mimetic artist (Republic X, 597b), and also the 
sophist (Sophist, 234e–235a). On the other hand, 
the actor’s art as such is never taken into consid-
eration except for brief references (e.g. Ion, 532d, 
or Charmides, 162d, where it appears in a simile).
The same can be said in respect to Aristotle4. 
At the beginning of the Poetics we read: «Epic 
2 In New Testament Greek, however, it is used with the 
same meaning as théama, “spectacle”: «God has exhibited 
us apostles as last of all, as though sentenced to death, 
because we have become a spectacle to the world [théa-
tron egenḗthēmen tôi kósmōi], to angels and to mortals» 
(1 Corinthians, 4:9, NRSV).
3 G. R. F. Ferrari calls this aspect the «theatricality» of the 
poetic experience in Plato’s time, and states that the con-
cept of mimesis basically designates nothing else ([1989]: 
92-99). See also Havelock (1986): 79-116, Baldry (1975): 
1-2 and Fränkel (1997): 33 ss.
4 For a rigorous state-of-the-art treatment of this question 
in the double perspective of Plato and Aristotle, see in 
this issue Andrea Capra’s Mythos and mimesis from Plato 
to Aristotle.
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poetry and tragedy, as also comedy, dithyrambic 
poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, 
are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation 
[pâsai tynchánousin oûsai mimḗseis tò sýnolon]» 
(1447a13-16). In that work Aristotle proposes 
to speak «not only of poetry in general but also 
of its species and their respective capacities; of 
the structure of plot required for a good poem» 
(1447a8-11). The question of the modes of dic-
tion is deliberately put aside, «as appertaining to 
another art, and not to that of poetry» (cf. 1456b8-
18). The mimesis established in the Poetics, as 
opposed to that of Plato, does not go beyond the 
frame of the poetic, even though the conceptual 
widening which is operated by Aristotle here may 
allow us to foresee the tendency to do so.
2) Secondly, it must be proved that Plato’s the-
ory has shaped and set up our modern conception 
of theatrical mimesis. And this, too, is not evident. 
All classical theatrical — and, in general, literary 
— precepts have unquestionably been influenced 
by Aristotle’s Poetics and its conception of mimesis. 
Commentaries such as those of Robertello, Maggi, 
Varchi, Vettori, Castelvetro, and Scaliger will have 
a strong influence on the traditional theory of the-
atre, from the Italian Renaissance to the Spanish 
Golden Age, and even later on5.
3) Thirdly, it must be proved that the notion of 
character, at the moment of its emergence in the 
history of theatre, presents the Platonic scheme 
in its theoretical configuration. This is also prob-
lematic, since the idea of character is equally 
unknown to both Plato and Aristotle; the prát-
tontas used by Plato (see Rep. X, 603c) as well as 
by Aristotle in his Poetics, meaning “actors” or, 
more precisely, “(people) acting”, can refer, at 
times indistinctly, to both theatre actors and act-
ing narrators (cf. Guénoun [1997]: 21-25). The 
actor–character distinction does not belong to this 
phase.
5 Even in order to distance himself from Aristotle’s tenets, 
Lope de Vega has him as his main reference in his Arte 
nuevo de hacer comedias en este tiempo (1609). Aristotle 
is also the main reference for French Classicism; see La 
Pratique du théâtre (1657) by the Abbé d’Aubignac.
In order to see how this idea has been set up, 
«let us return» — as Plato’s Socrates likes to repeat 
— «to the beginning» (Second Alcibiades, 140d). I 
will briefly present the most prominent aspects of 
Plato’s reflection on mimesis, then I will examine 
the founding concepts of Denis Diderot’s Para-
doxe sur le comédien, noting his Platonism as well 
as his differences from it, and in the third place I 
will attempt to sketch out, following Erwin Pan-
ofsky’s Idea, the main landmarks in this thwarted 
history — we will see why — which has lead from 
Plato’s theory of mimesis to Diderot’s thoughts on 
the character.
1. MIMESIS IN PLATO
The attention that Plato pays to mimesis can be 
seen in many of his dialogues. From the Cratylus 
to the Laws, considered in different perspectives, 
mimesis is noticeably scattered across the whole 
of his work. Even though the notion is designated 
by certain commentators as «that most baffling of 
all words in his philosophical vocabulary», it is 
impossible to understand Plato’s critique of poetry 
unless we come to terms with this notion (Have-
lock [1963]: 20).
In the sense of “imitation”, mimesis appears at 
the beginning of the Cratylus, when Socrates and 
Hermogenes establish that, when the nomothete 
attributes names to things, he necessarily has, like 
any other artisan, his eyes fixed on an ideal mod-
el (389a-e). Mimesis shapes up from here on as a 
hinge between two systems of reality: the object 
and its image, the imitated thing and that which 
imitates it, the rose and its name6. It articulates 
them and, at the same time, marks the differ-
6 The title of Umberto Eco’s famous novel Il nome del-
la rosa (1980) has its origin in a variation of a verse in 
a poem by Bernard of Morval (c. 1150), De contemptu 
mundi, in which Eco changes “Rome” into “rose”: «Stat 
Roma pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus»; a vari-
ation that I believe to be derived from the theme of the 
Cratylus. That theme of the name of the rose in Plato’s 
dialogue had also been recalled by Jorge Luis Borges in 
the first verses of his poem El Golem, in El otro, el mismo 
(1964).
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ence. This line of meaning will be deepened in the 
dialogues of Plato’s late period (Sophist, Critias), 
where the ontological sense, often pejorative, of 
“production of a copy,” is asserted.
It is, however, in the Republic where mimesis is 
most thoroughly examined. That happens in two 
stages. First, in book III, it serves to designate one 
of the two modes of saying [lexis] of which the 
poet can make use in the course of a narration 
[diḗgēsis]. He can proceed either by simple narra-
tion [haplêi diēgḗsei] — which is when «the poet 
himself is the speaker and does not even attempt 
to suggest to us that anyone but himself is speak-
ing» (III, 393a) — or using a narration by mimesis 
[diḗgēsis dià mimḗseōs], when «he delivers as if he 
were  himself Chryses7 and tries as far as may be 
to make us feel that not Homer is the speaker, but 
the priest, an old man» (III, 393b). This argument 
will be prolonged throughout the rest of the book 
to finally conclude by characterizing the mimetic 
poet as the double or multiple man «capable by 
his cunning of assuming every kind of shape and 
imitating all things» (III, 398a-b); a man who does 
not have his place in the perfect city of the Repub-
lic, given that each member accomplishes one sole 
task.
Later, in book X, after having exposed his 
theory of Ideas beginning from book VI, Socrates 
brings back the question of poetic mimesis, this 
time to consider it, as he says, «in general, as a 
whole» (595c). That leads, in the economy of the 
dialogue, to a broadening of the mimetic field that 
includes the art of painting, from which other 
properties of mimesis are deducted. What Socrates 
derives from painting, or «mimetic art linked to 
vision», will equally be applicable to poetry, or 
«mimetic art linked to hearing»:
— To which is painting directed in every case, to 
the imitation of reality as it is or of appearance as it 
appears [pròs tò phainómenon, hôs phaínetai]? Is it 
an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth?
— Of a phantasm [phantásmatos], he said. 
— Then the mimetic art [hē mimētikḗ] is far removed 
7 In the well-known episode of the first chant of the Iliad.
from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can 
produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of 
only a small part of the object and that a phantom 
[eidolon] (Rep. X, 598b-c).
Thus, the eminent disjunction is set up: being 
[eînai], and appearing [phaínesthai], or not being 
really. The being that participates in appear-
ing is designated by Plato by the generic name 
of «image» [eidolon]. In relation to the Idea, the 
image is deficient, inauthentic and multiple, and 
it is so by virtue of mimesis. Mimesis is there-
fore what links the image to the real being and, 
at the same time, what dispossesses the image 
from the real being: this is what the ontological 
status of semblance paradoxically means (Ver-
nant [1975]: 136). This distance separating the 
image from being is segmented by the percepti-
ble object. Socrates expresses it in an ordinal way, 
building the famous hierarchy of the real which 
relegates imitation to the third and last rank8. The 
well-known example is that of the three beds: the 
«Form» or «Idea» [eîdos] of bed; the particular bed 
that the craftsman makes in the likeness of the Idea 
of bed; and the painted bed, which imitates the 
craftsman’s bed as it appears to the painter (598a).
Whether it is an exact copy [eikṓn] or a simu-
lacrum [phántasma] aiming to produce a trompe-
l’œil effect, the painter’s bed is always an imitation 
of the visible bed produced by the craftsman, and 
not of the Idea or the essence of bed9. The unreal-
ity of the painted bed explains the capacity of the 
imitator to embrace everything in his imitation. 
He seems to be able to produce everything, in so 
far as what he produces seems to be. But it is not. 
Here resides the nature, ontologically deceitful, of 
mimesis for Plato.
8 «Three removes from nature», an expression from this 
point forward associated with mimesis and its deriva-
tives and repeated many times along this reasoning: 597e, 
599a, 599d, 602c, 605c.
9 Eikónes and phantásmata are for Plato particular forms 
of eídōla, and these two are diverse genres of mimếmata, 
not apprehended in their dimension of facts of con-
sciousness, but as objective products of certain types of 
art (cf. Vernant [1975]: 142).
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Let us retain two characteristics of the mimetic 
artist which will then allow the application of this 
principle to theatre:
1) His aptitude to imitate everything (Rep. X, 
598b-c).
2) His capacity to pass himself off as the origi-
nal (Rep. X, 599a).
2. THE CHARACTER IN DIDEROT
Let’s now consider the Paradoxe sur le comédi-
en by Denis Diderot. We can start realizing a fact: 
the distinction between actor and character does 
not belong to the ancient Greeks; it is not even 
present a century before Diderot10, but was some-
thing acquired in the times when he wrote11.
A certain aesthetic tendency in the 18th cen-
tury, however, advocated a sensible connection 
between the actor and the text, which brings him 
to try to create a fusion with his role by means of 
a naturalistic type of acting, whose premise is to 
effectively feel the character’s passions12. In oppo-
sition to the dominant tendency, Diderot radical-
izes in his Paradoxe the separation between actor 
and character — which is what gives its paradoxi-
cal allure to his proposition: the actor does not 
confuse himself with the character, he is not him, 
since he plays him, «et il le joue si bien que vous le 
prenez pour tel; l’illusion n’est que pour vous; il sait 
bien, lui, qu’il ne l’est pas» (Diderot [1995]: 77)13.
10 «On emploie couramment encore acteur pour person-
nage au XVIIe siècle français» (Abirached [1994]: 10).
11 The Paradoxe sur le comédien is thought to have been 
written between 1773 and 1777, although it was not pub-
lished, posthumously, until 1830.
12 A tendency defended in Le Comédien (1747) by 
Rémond de Sainte-Albine, and in the booklet Garrick ou 
les Acteurs anglais (1750) by Sticotti, which the character 
called “The First One” in Diderot’s Paradoxe explicitly 
contests.
13 As Prof. Capra observes, we can appreciate, in the fol-
lowing words of Plato’s Ion, a similar separation between 
the actor, on the one hand, and his acting and the effects 
produced in the spectators on the other: «SOCRATES: 
Do you know that you rhapsodes also affect the major-
Having established this, he next explains why, 
for the good actor, playing a character is equal to 
copying an idea, a model that he imitates the best 
way he knows how. In this, his art does not differ 
from the art of the painter, the sculptor, the musi-
cian, or of any other artist (Diderot [1995]: 52). As 
well as for Plato, the principle of artistic creation 
is unique; in Diderot’s words, imitation, copy of a 
model: «Les grands poètes, les grands acteurs, et 
peut-être en général tous les grands imitateurs de 
la nature» (Diderot [1995]: 53). 
It is, perhaps, in the following passage, which 
draws a relation between the actor’s and the paint-
er’s art, that one can feel the effects of a certain 
Platonism in Diderot14:
Votre acteur et votre peintre tombent tous deux dans 
un même défaut, et je leur dirai: «Votre tableau, 
votre jeu, ne sont que des portraits d’individus fort 
au-dessous de l’idée générale que le poète a tracée, 
et du modèle idéal dont je me promettais la copie. 
Votre voisine est belle, très belle; d’accord: mais ce 
n’est pas la Beauté. Il y a aussi loin de votre ouvrage 
à votre modèle que de votre modèle à l’idéal» (Dide-
rot [1995]: 97-98).
The same distance that separates a beautiful 
woman from Beauty15 also separates the actor’s 
ity of your spectators the same way? ION: I know it very 
well. I look down from time to time from the stage and 
see them weeping and gazing up at me fearfully, sharing 
the astonishment of what is being said. I have to pay close 
attention to them: because if I make them cry, I’ll later 
laugh myself for the money I make, but if they laugh, I’ll 
myself cry for money lost» (Ion, 535e, emphasis mine). 
14 In what concerns Plato’s influence on Diderot, we 
know that during his imprisonment in the donjon tower 
of the Château de Vincennes (1749), Diderot translated 
the Apology of Socrates («j’avais un petit Platon dans ma 
poche», he later wrote to Sophie Volland while describing 
this sad sojourn). He also wrote the entry “Socratique” of 
the Encyclopédie, and had in mind the project of a philo-
sophical drama about Socrates’ death, which he never 
wrote, of which a “Socratic scene” is sketched out in De 
la poésie dramatique (1758). Cf. Diderot (1978): 237-241; 
Trousson (1967): 24, 105-124.
15 We can remark the use here by Diderot of the capital 
letter (“la Beauté”), following the usage in modern Pla-
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acting from the idea of the poet. The actor’s talent 
consists of getting these two poles closer by imi-
tating an ideal model that is — Diderot does not 
cease to repeat — forged by his imagination, and 
that evidently corresponds to the character. «Dans 
ce moment —Diderot says writing about a famous 
actress of the Comédie Française playing a charac-
ter of Jean Racine’s Britannicus — elle est double: 
la petite Clairon et la grande Agrippine» (Diderot 
[1995]: 52). In consequence, there is a hierarchical 
coexistence of the actor with the character.  
Let us now see this process of creation of the 
character as Diderot specifies it, and take notice of 
its unquestionable Platonic air:
Quel jeu plus parfait que celui de la Clairon? […] 
Sans doute elle s’est fait un modèle auquel elle a 
d’abord cherché à se conformer; sans doute elle a 
conçu ce modèle le plus haut, le plus grand, le plus 
parfait qu’il lui a été possible; mais ce modèle qu’elle 
a emprunté de l’histoire, ou que son imagination a 
créé comme un grand fantôme, ce n’est pas elle. […] 
Quand, à force de travail, elle a approché de cette 
idée le plus près qu’elle a pu, tout est fini; se tenir 
ferme là, c’est une affaire d’exercice et de mémoire 
(Diderot [1995]: 73, emphasis mine).
Now, to sum up: what is — positively — the 
character as Diderot understands it? «What is the 
truth of the scene?» is the question that he, through 
the character called “The First (Interlocutor)” (Le 
Premier) asks himself, and his answer contains what 
we are searching for: «it is the conformity of the 
actions, of the discourses, of the figure, the voice, 
the movement, the gesture, with an ideal model 
imagined by the poet and often exaggerated by the 
actor» (Diderot [1995]: 80, trans. mine).
In consequence, we can deduce that, in this 
context:
1) The character is an ideal model imagined by 
the poet.
tonic literature when referring to an “Idea”. In Greater 
Hippias (287e ss.) there is also an echo of this difference 
between Beauty and something beautiful (a woman in 
both texts).
2) Truth consists of the faithful imitation of 
this model («the truth of the scene»).
This conclusion sounds scandalous if we think 
of the Platonic hierarchy mentioned before, where 
the artist’s copy draws away from truth by three 
degrees. It is as if the Platonic Idea had come 
down from its metaphysical kingdom and now 
lived in the imagination of the mimetic artists 
— precisely the people that Socrates had banned 
from the Republic’s “ideal” city.
3. WHERE IS THE IDEA?, OR CONCERNING 
HOW WE GOT THERE
In view of the previous analysis, a problem 
clearly stands out: since Plato’s metaphysics seems 
to make an authentic philosophy of art impos-
sible, how is it possible that all Western aesthet-
ics has been, in a certain sense, inspired by Plato? 
This is the starting point of Ernst Cassirer’s lec-
ture Eidos und Eidolon (Cassirer [1924). In it the 
author remarks that there does not exist, prop-
erly speaking, a Platonic aesthetics. The Beautiful, 
which occupies an essential place in Plato’s sys-
tem, has nothing to do with art. It is something 
abstract founded on the perfection of the math-
ematical order and measure. This is precisely the 
reason why Plato condemns art. This ascertain-
ment is also the starting point of Erwin Panofsky’s 
emblematic work Idea (1924), which will serve us 
as a guide in the backwards search for the surpris-
ing offspring of the Platonic mimesis in order to 
understand the movement by which such a con-
ceptual turnaround has taken place.  
The first milestone of this history is Cicero. 
«Cicero, in his Orator, […] compares the perfect 
speaker with an “idea”, which we cannot encoun-
ter in experience but only imagine, and which in 
this respect resembles the object of artistic repre-
sentation» (Panofsky [1924]: 11)16. This is how the 
transition is done. But how is this new interpre-
tation associated to Plato? «Plato […] calls these 
16 It is inevitable to think here of the idea of character 
that Diderot exemplified in La Clairon.
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forms of things ideas» (emphasis mine); Cicero 
writes the word in Greek (idéas [ἰδέας]) and then 
adds: «he [Plato] asserts that they exist eternally, 
being contained in our reason and our intellect» 
(Panofsky [1924]: 12). By confining them to the 
mind, Cicero just opened the door to a non-Pla-
tonic, and even anti-Platonic, meaning of idea. 
The artist — the orator in this case — is thus no 
longer an imitator of the sensible world in its 
deceptive aspect; instead, «in his own mind there 
dwells a glorious prototype of beauty upon which 
he, as a creator, may cast his inner eye» (Panofsky 
[1924]: 13).
It is, indeed, from “idea”, such as Cicero writes 
and redefines it, that the term “ideal” derives: 
a term which replaces the platonic eîdos and 
through which the shift in meaning is consum-
mated, in the extent that the ideal is a confused 
notion; its ambiguity being due to the fact that it 
does not belong to the sensible world nor to the 
intelligible world.  
With the Renaissance, a radical mutation in 
the theory of art takes place. It can be connected 
with what Aristotle wrote: «art either imitates the 
works of nature or completes that which nature 
is unable to bring to completion» (Physics II, 8, 
199a15-18). On the one hand, art imitates nature. 
But it will be asserted that, at the same time, art 
also surpasses nature, correcting and perfecting it 
with the help of imagination. Combined in a pow-
erful synthesis, one can find the two principles of 
imitation and perfection in the art of Michelange-
lo, poetically theorized in his Rimes. For the Flor-
entine genius, the properly artistic operation con-
sists of releasing the pure form that lies hidden in 
the rough block of stone:
Sì come per levar, donna, si pone
in pietra alpestra e dura
una viva figura,
che là più cresce u’ più la pietra scema
(Rima LXXXIV, in Buonarroti [1992]: 198-199).
The marble block encloses the form that the 
artist imagines in his mind among many other 
possibilities. This «removal of what is superfluous» 
is carried out by the hand of the artist while obey-
ing his intellect:
Non ha l’ottimo artista alcun concetto
ch’un marmo solo in sé non circonscriva
col suo superchio, e solo a quello arriva
la man che ubbidisce all’intelletto 
(Rima LXXXIII, in Buonarroti [1992]: 196-198).
In other words, the form is in the marble in 
potency. The transition to act is guided by an idea 
(a concetto) that the artist has and that guides his 
manual work, which consists of clearing away all 
that is superfluous from the block.  
Despite the Aristotelian weight carried by this 
view, already noted by Benedetto Varchi17, Michel-
angelo’s concept [concetto] has the same mean-
ing as idea, understood as a representation which 
freely creates its own object and can therefore 
constitute a model which allows the creation of 
external forms.
But let us now take a step forward and move 
on to Diderot. Understood as what the artist pur-
sues, the «ideal model» in his conception appears 
to be the transposition of the eidetic device that 
we have handled when reading Plato: the idea as 
a model becomes, in Diderot’s thought about the 
actor’s art, the ideal model. But an adjective that 
Diderot continuously repeats qualifies and speci-
fies these two words: imagined. This is where Den-
is Guénoun notices the flaw: «Diderot’s models 
move in a space that Plato cannot approach: they 
are imagined» (Guénoun [1997]: 71, trans. mine). 
However, the vocabulary persists: «la Cléopâtre, la 
Mérope, l’Agrippine, le Cinna du théâtre, sont-ils 
même des personnages historiques? Non. Ce sont 
les fantômes imaginaires de la poésie» (Diderot 
[1995]: 79). Here are the phantoms [phantásmata], 
as a species of image [eidolon], established in the 
17 As reported by Panofsky: «the thought that the “idea” 
of a work of art is present [energeíai] in the artist, is just 
as Aristotelian as the notion that the work of art itself 
lies locked [dynámei] in the stone or wood. It would be 
“Platonic” (i.e., Neoplatonic) only if an unconditional 
supremacy of the Idea in relation to the realized work of 
art were maintained» (Panofsky [1924]: 120-121).
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imaginary world of classical theater by a sort of 
reversed Platonism. This is patent in the hierarchi-
cal division of models established by Diderot:
Il y a trois modèles, l’homme de la nature, l’homme 
du poète, l’homme de l’acteur. Celui de la nature est 
moins grand de celui du poète, et celui-ci moins grand 
encore que celui du grand comédien, le plus exagéré 
de tous. Ce dernier monte sur les épaules du précé-
dent, et se renferme dans un grand mannequin d’osier 
dont il est l’âme (Diderot [1995]: 130).
Like Plato’s three beds in the Republic —the 
Idea of bed, the craftsman’s sensible bed and the 
painted bed—, or the three rings of the magnet-
ized chain in the Ion (535e–536d) —the Muse, 
the poet and the actor—, Diderot establishes for 
theatre three categories of men, with the great dif-
ference that the pyramid has been inverted: situ-
ating at its base the man of nature — which for 
Plato corresponds to the sensible bed —, Diderot 
places the poet’s man or written character at sec-
ond rank, and over him places the actor’s man, 
at the peak of this hierarchy. In this new system, 
the «great wicker mannequin» would thus be the 
character, whose soul is the actor, the artist par 
excellence. 
This conception of the character, with its her-
itage of reversed Platonism, has exerted a decisive 
influence on modern thought on theatre:
Othello et Hermione contiennent toutes les jalousies 
qu’on peut répertorier et ils en excèdent tous les cas, 
un par un  […]. Hamlet continuera à préexister à 
toutes ses incarnations et, par-là, à justifier son sta-
tut théâtral, si bien que l’on se trompera chaque fois 
qu’on voudra l’étudier comme Napoléon, Gandhi ou 
le fils de la voisine (Abirached [1994] : 21-22, 34 and 
passim).
We can therefore very well see that Platonic 
mimesis beats at the very heart of the theory of 
modern theatre despite the fact that for the tradi-
tional theory of classical theatre the indisputable 
reference is Aristotle’s Poetics and its mimesis. As 
Guénoun observes:
Pour Platon, la mimèsis sépare et oppose l’imitation 
et ce qu’elle montre (ou prétend montrer), l’icône et 
l’eidos, l’“image” et l’idée. L’imitation est pour lui hété-
rogène à ce à quoi elle renvoie sans cesse, et son men-
songe s’établit dans sa prétention à ignorer cet écart. 
C’est Platon sans doute qui construit et met en place 
la structure du mimétique telle que nous la manipu-
lons aujourd’hui (Guénoun [1997]: 22).
And this mimesis, as Lacoue-Labarthe points 
out, by its own and proper stand-in function, has 
theatre as its exemplary model:
La mimésis théâtrale, autrement dit, donne le modèle 
de la mimésis générale. L’art, en tant qu’il se substi-
tue à la nature, en tant qu’il la remplace […], pro-
duit toujours un théâtre, une représentation. Ce qui 
veut dire une autre présentation, ou la présentation 
d’autre chose, qui n’était pas encore là, donnée ou pré-
sente. D’où, cela se comprend de soi, le rôle privilégié 
qu’Aristote accordait au théâtre, et le rôle exorbitant 
que Diderot accorde au comédien, au grand comédien 
(Lacoue-Labarthe [1986]: 25).
Yet, this substitute function of reality attrib-
uted to the art which, in the image of theatre, 
gives the pattern of the general mimesis such as is 
dealt with by Diderot, is well rooted in Plato, in 
that aspect in virtue of which imitations substitute 
reality in a deceitful way; otherwise said, in the 
opposition between mimesis and alḗtheia.
The formidable effect is not due to the fact 
that what is theatrically represented might be false 
or morally blameworthy. Plato highlights a dimen-
sion that is new, incommensurable: that of, bor-
rowing Heidegger’s words ([2002]: 18 and passim), 
«the opening up of being». According to this rea-
soning, imitation implies being other, being sev-
eral, potentially being everything; and as Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe states, referring to Diderot:
Pour tout imiter — tout (re)présenter ou tout (re)
produire, au sens le plus fort — il faut n’être rien 
par soi-même, n’avoir rien en propre. Le paradoxe 
énonce une loi d’impropriété qui est la loi même de 
la mimésis: seul “l’homme sans qualités”, le sujet sans 
sujet (absent à lui-même, distrait de lui-même, pri-
vé de soi) est à même de présenter ou de produire en 
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général. Platon le savait très bien: le miméticien est 
le pire des engeances, parce qu’il n’est personne, pur 
masque et comme tel inassignable, irrepérable, impos-
sible à fixer dans une fonction qui lui soit propre et 
qui trouve sa place dans la juste répartition des tâches 
(Lacoue-Labarthe [1986]: 27; emphasis mine).
Condemning the double or multiple man to 
ostracism, Socrates nonetheless defines the model 
towards which the actor’s art will tend in the cen-
turies to come. The good actor is versatile; he is 
capable of imitating everything (cf. Diderot [1995]: 
71 and the analysis of Lacoue-Labarthe [1986]: 
22). As Diderot states:
Le point important […] ce sont les qualités premières 
d’un grand comédien. Moi je lui veux beaucoup de 
jugement  ; il me faut dans cet homme un spectateur 
froid et tranquille  ; j’en exige, par conséquent, de la 
pénétration et nulle sensibilité, l’art de tout imiter, 
ou, ce qui revient au même, une égale aptitude à 
toutes sortes de caractères et de rôles (Diderot [1995]: 
49–50, emphasis mine).
The aspect itself that Socrates rejects is what 
fixes the philosophical thought on theatre. Hence-
forth, theatrical mimesis is conceived as a multipli-
er of being. The seed of the existential conception 
of theatrical representation (cf. Gouhier [1952]: 
25-32) is here sowed.
In order to illustrate this reversal, we can 
observe the functioning of the mirror motive in 
both authors, placing them face to face:
— But now consider what name you would give to 
this craftsman […] who makes all the things that all 
handicraftsmen severally produce […], all plants and 
animals, including himself, and thereto earth and 
heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in 
Hades under the earth. 
— A most marvelous sophist — he said.
— Are you incredulous? — said I […] – Do you not 
perceive that you yourself would be able to make all 
these things in a way?
— And in what way? 
— […] You could do it most quickly if you should 
choose to take a mirror and carry it about every-
where. You will speedily produce the sun and all the 
things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself 
and the other animals and implements and plants 
and all the objects of which we just now spoke.
— Yes — he said —, the appearance of them, but not 
the reality and the truth 
(Plato, Rep. X, 596c-e).
Au lieu que le comédien qui jouera de réflex-
ion, d’étude de la nature humaine, d’imitation 
constante d’auprès quelque modèle idéal, 
d’imagination, de mémoire, sera un, le même à 
toutes les représentations, toujours également par-
fait […]: c’est une glace toujours disposée à mon-
trer les objets et à les montrer avec la même pré-
cision, la même force et la même vérité (Diderot 
[1995]: 72-73).
CONCLUSION
This is how we pass, through this unexpected 
identification, from the Platonic Idea to the artistic 
representation; a fabulous destiny, if one ponders 
it, of this mimesis in whose name poets were driv-
en out of Plato’s virtuous city and which seemed 
to invalidate in principle all philosophy of art. It 
is on this track that I would locate my hypothesis 
concerning a possible development of this thought 
on mimesis in its modern reception.
However, for what pertains specifically to the 
thinking about theatre, we can indeed see how the 
Platonic reflection on mimesis has been able to 
mark — through a chain of reception from Cicero 
to Diderot, passing through the Renaissance art-
ists — the movement that will bring it, through 
a turnaround of the meaning of idea, to conceive 
the character, «a walking abstraction», as Alfred 
Jarry once said18 of this ideal entity, intermediate 
between the letter and the body.
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